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socio-economic rights. Not soon thereafter socio-economic rights were 
tested in the case of Mushoriwa v City of Harare in 2014. The High Court 
made a finding in favour of the applicant, a decision which enforced the 
right to water in section 77 of the Constitution. The ruling offered the 
view that the water bylaws used were unconstitutional and contrary to 
the enabling statute. This judgment was welcomed as a ‘first true test’ 
of socio-economic rights under the 2013 Constitution. In Hove v City of 
Harare the High Court judge agreed with the reasoning of the Court in 
Mushoriwa v City of Harare that, in the event of a genuine dispute of a 
water bill, there should be a recourse to the courts for remedies. In 2018, 
however, the Supreme Court overturned the decision in the Mushoriwa 
case. It declared that water disconnections in terms of the water bylaw 
are above board. This raises questions as to the constitutional obligation 
to protect the right to water imposed upon all organs of the state. It is 
against this background that this article reviews the case of Mushoriwa 
and makes comments on the effects of this judgment, specifically about 
the enforcement of socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe.
Keywords: constitutionality; right to water; Mushoriwa; socio-economic 
rights
1 Introduction 
The right to water is entrenched in section 77 of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution.1 The Bill of Rights in the Zimbabwean Constitution 
contains similar obligations to those contained in the South African 
Constitution.2 Zimbabwe is one of only three countries in Southern 
Africa that expressly provide for the right to water (the other two 
being South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC)).3 Section 77 of the Zimbabwean Constitution provides that 
every person has the right to safe, clean and potable water.4 Be 
that as it may, it is important to note that certain positive duties 
imposed by the right are not immediately enforceable.5 This is 
1 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013. 
2 T Chivuru ‘Socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe’s new Constitution’ (2014) 36 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa 127; A Moyo ‘Basic tenets of Zimbabwe’s 
new constitutional order’ (2019) Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law 10.
3 G Matchaya et al ‘Justiciability of the right to water in the SADC region: A critical 
appraisal’ (2018) 7 Open Access Journal 1.
4 Sec 77(a) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
5 S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An 
effective tool in challenging poverty’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 
Journal 134; C Heyns & D Brand (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 
309.
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because the enforcement of the right, as in the case of most – if not 
all – socio-economic rights is subject to the availability of resources 
and progressive realisation.6 Furthermore, this right is subject to 
limitation ‘in terms of a law of general application and to the extent 
that such limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in 
a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, 
equality and freedom’.7 
Several pieces of legislation regulating the use of and access to 
water for domestic use were in operation before the enactment of the 
2013 Constitution. These include (i) the Water Bylaws 164 of 1913 
which in section 8 empower a municipality, with notice in writing, to 
without compensation and prejudice to its right to obtain payment 
for the supply of water to the consumer, discontinue supplies to the 
consumer; and (ii) section 69(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 3 of the Urban 
Councils Act [chapter 29:15] which expressly empowers the Council 
to make bylaws that allow it to cut off water supplies. As noted by 
Muremba J in Hove v City of Harare:8
Whilst our Constitution protects the right to water it also empowers 
local authorities to levy rates and taxes to raise revenue for service 
provision. This means that costs committed for the purpose of 
providing a safe water supply must be recovered. I take this to mean 
that the right to water does not prohibit disconnections of water 
services for non-payment.
Whether or not such interpretation accords with the Constitution 
remains disputed. The Community Water Alliance, for instance, 
argues that section 8 of Statutory Instrument (SI) 164 of 1913 is 
unconstitutional because of its implications on the right to water.9 
This article reviews the recent case of City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa10 
where the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) reversed the decision of 
the High Court with regard to the legality of water disconnections 
in Zimbabwe. 
2 The right to water under international law
It is important to explore the various international legal instruments 
that provide for the right to water. This is because the way in which 
the right to water is interpreted under international law becomes 
6 Sec 77 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
7 Sec 86 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
8 HH 205/16.
9 Community Water Alliance ‘Supreme Court ruling on arbitrary water 
disconnections: Implications on the human right to water in Zimbabwe’, http://
www.kubatana.net.ac.za (accessed 7 November 2019). 
10 City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa SC54/2018.
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relevant in determining the scope and application of the right in 
our jurisdiction. Section 46 of the 2013 Constitution enjoins any 
competent court, tribunal, forum or body to consider international 
law and all relevant treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is 
a state party.11 
It should be highlighted at this point that the right to water as 
contemplated by these international legal instruments has been 
domesticated into the law of Zimbabwe, culminating in section 
77 of the Constitution. Section 327 of the Constitution requires 
international law to be domesticated under an Act of Parliament for 
it to be binding. It can therefore be ascertained that section 77 of the 
Constitution has the effect of domesticating international law on the 
right to water such that it becomes binding on Zimbabwe.
The convenient starting point to discuss the right to water in the 
international context is the United Nations Charter of 1945 (UN 
Charter).12 The UN Charter is the founding document of the UN 
and is an instrument of international law. The document codifies 
the major principles of international relations and is binding on all 
members. While the UN Charter is not a source of international 
human rights law, it commits member states to certain values 
relevant for the attainment of human rights. One of these ideals is 
the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions conducive to economic and social development.13
In addition to this, the UN Charter also calls for the identification 
of solutions to international social, economic and health-related 
problems.14 These standards are relevant to the realisation of the 
right to water. This is because, while they do not expressly refer to 
the right, the right may be inferred from these provisions. This is 
because it may be argued that a society with perennial shortages 
of safe drinking water would certainly be hostile to these set goals. 
Therefore, an obligation to provide adequate potable water to 
citizens would be inherent under this Charter. 
The second document essential to this debate is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.15 From the outset 
it is important to note that the Universal Declaration is not a 
11 Sec 46 as read with secs 326 and 327 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013.
12 Charter of the United Nations.
13 Art 55 UN Charter.
14 Art 55(b) UN Charter.
15 Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 
1928 by UNGA 217A.
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binding instrument, nor is it a source of law in the strict sense. 
This notwithstanding, it is paramount to consider this document 
as it is the basis upon which many international agreements were 
concluded.16 Further, the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
should be considered forceful because many of its contents form 
part of customary international law,17 which is considered binding 
in many countries, including Zimbabwe.18 Section 326 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that customary international law 
is binding on Zimbabwe to the extent that it is not inconsistent with 
the Constitution or any Act of Parliament.
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration provides that everyone has 
a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical 
care and health. As is evident, article 25 of this document does not 
expressly mention the right to water.19 However, there is a strong 
argument that this right is implied in this provision. This is because 
the understanding is that article 25 is not exhaustive but rather 
provides elements that constitute the right to an adequate standard 
of living. Moreover, it can further be argued that it was not necessary 
to expressly include the right to water in this document as one could 
not discuss the rights to food and health while excluding the right to 
water which is a prerequisite to the realisation of these rights.20 This 
is reinforced by the foundational argument that human rights are 
interconnected and indivisible.21
In 1966 UN member states adopted International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).22 ICESCR gives 
effect to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration in relation 
to certain fundamental rights and freedoms.23 It ‘provides the legal 
framework to protect and preserve the most basic economic, social 
16 N Silva, G Martins & L Heller ‘Human rights interdependence and indivisibility: 
A glance over the human rights to water and sanitation’ (2019) 19 BMC 
International Health and Human Rights 1. 
17 H Hannum ‘The UDHR in national and international law’ (1998) 3 Health and 
Human Rights 145.
18 France v Turkey PCIJ 1927, on the application of customary international law. see 
also North Sea Continental Shelf cases; S v Mann 2008 (1) ZLR 1 (H).
19 Art 25 provides that everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing, medical care, and necessary services.
20 J Scanion et al Water as a human right? (2004) 53.
21 I Koch Human rights and indivisible rights: The protection of socio-economic 
demands under the European Convention of Human Rights (2009) 1. 
22 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the 
UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 through GA Resolution 2200A 
(XXI), entered into force on 3 January 1976.
23 Preamble to ICESCR.
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and cultural rights’.24 Article 11 of ICESCR recognises the rights to 
an adequate standard of living, including sanitation, food and the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. In attempting to 
provide an interpretation of article 11 which considers the right to 
water, this provision has to be read with article 12 which provides 
for the right to health. As discussed earlier, the right to water cannot 
be discussed in isolation to other rights such as those to sanitation, 
food and health.25 This stems from the very important debate on the 
interconnectedness and indivisibility of human rights.26
The task of providing an interpretation to this Covenant has been 
entrusted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ESCR Committee). The ESCR Committee is an independent expert 
body that has been appointed to oversee the implementation of the 
Covenant by state parties. The ESCR Committee consists of 18 experts 
that are appointed by way of ballot for four-year terms.27 The ESCR 
Committee periodically provides General Comments on a myriad of 
issues such as the substantive issues arising from ICESCR.28 General 
Comment 6 (1995)29 explored the economic, social and cultural 
rights of older persons. The ESCR Committee noted concerning 
article 11 of ICESCR that ‘[o]lder persons should have access to 
adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, and health care through the 
provision of income, family and community support and self-help’.30 
In so doing, the ESCR Committee recognised the right to water via 
the right to an adequate standard of living. 
In 2002 the Committee made available to the public General 
Comment 15. The General Comment considers substantive issues 
arising in the implementation of ICESCR. More specifically, it focuses 
on deciding whether this right is implicit in articles 11 and 12 of 
ICESCR.31 The ESCR Committee found in favour of the existence of 
such a right when a generous interpretation of these provisos was 
afforded. It found that the legal bases of the right to water were as 
follows:32
24 Women, Peace and Security ‘International Covenant on Social and Cultural 
Rights’, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/int/treaty-bodies/international-covenant-
on-economic-social-and-cultural-rights/ (accessed 9 April 2021).
25 P Hall et al ‘The human right to water: The importance of domestic and 
productive water rights’ (2014) Science and Engineering Ethics 849. 
26 Silva et al (n 16) 1. See also J Bouchard & P Meyer-Bisch ‘Intersectionality and 
interdependence of human rights: Same or different?’ (2016) 16 Equal Rights 
Review 186. 
27 Women, Peace and Security (n 24). 
28 See, eg, ESCR Committee General Comment 9 (1998).
29 ESCR Committee General Comment 6 (1995).
30 ESCR Committee General Comment 6 (n 29) 7.
31 ESCR Committee General Comment  15 (2002) 1.
32 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 (n 31) 2.
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The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal 
and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to 
prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related 
disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and 
domestic hygienic requirements.
The ESCR Committee was of the view that the list of rights giving 
effect to the right to an adequate standard of living was not intended 
to be exhaustive.33 This was as a result of the use of the word 
‘including’ which signalled that the drafters intended more rights 
than simply the stipulated rights (food, clothing and housing) to be 
covered.34 A considered interrogation of the right to water would 
indicate that the right to water was essential to the guarantee of 
an adequate standard of living as it was vital to the survival of any 
person.35 
The right to water was inevitably linked to the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health in article 12 of ICESCR and other rights 
in the International Bill of Human rights such as the right to life and 
human dignity.36 The ESCR Committee reasoned that in leading a 
life in human dignity, the right to water was indispensable and was a 
prerequisite to the realisation of other rights such as the rights to an 
adequate standard of living, including food, clothing and housing.37 
The ESCR Committee noted that a major reason for the adoption 
of such an approach was the fact that the implementation and 
enforcement of this human right had been challenging in the 
context of a developing country.38 At the time of the drafting of 
the General Comment (in 2003), over 1 billion persons across the 
globe lacked access to water, while several billions (an estimated 2,3 
billion) lacked access to proper sanitation, a major cause of water 
contamination and water-based diseases.39 
Instructive for the purposes of this article was the discussion on the 
normative content of the right to water in the General Comment.40 
It was noted that the right to water contains both freedoms and 
entitlements. Freedoms, inter alia, include ‘the right to maintain 





37 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 1.
38 As above.
39 As above.
40 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 4.
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and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free 
from arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies.41 
In contradistinction, entitlements include ‘the right to a system of 
water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity 
for people to enjoy the right to water’.42
The ESCR Committee noted that, in determining whether the 
provision of water is adequate, it must be noted that the adequacy 
of the water could not be narrowly interpreted by focusing on 
volumetric quantities and technologies.43 Rather, water had to be 
treated as a social and cultural good as opposed to a social good.44 
This notwithstanding, how this goal is attained had to be done in a 
manner that was sustainable, to ensure the future attainment of this 
right.45 Of key importance was the fact that while what could be 
considered as an adequate amount of water for the realisation of this 
right could vary, certain factors had to be present in every scenario.46 
These are availability, quality and accessibility. 
First, in terms of availability, the ESCR Committee notes that each 
person must have access to a sufficient and continuous water supply 
for personal and domestic use.47 The amount made available for 
this purpose should correspond with the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) guidelines for domestic water quantity. Currently, the WHO 
provides that each person must be given access to 15 litres per day 
per person, as soon as possible.48 It is worth noting that while this 
estimate is provided as a guide, it is recommended that every person 
be given access to at least 50 to 60 litres of water every day.49 In 
emergencies, this daily limit may be reduced to 7,5 litres per person 
per day.50 In this event, untreated water may be used for personal 
purposes such as laundry and bathing.51 Importantly, the WHO notes 
that these amounts should be provided even if the quality of the 






46 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 5.
47 As above.




49 M Gorsboth & E Wolf Identifying and addressing violations of the human right to 
work: Applying the human rights approach (2008) 8.
50 World Health Organisation (n 48).
51 As above.
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Second, in terms of quality, the ESCR Committee notes that the 
water should be safe, meaning that it must be free of any micro-
organisms, chemical substances, or radiological substances that 
could pose a danger to a person’s health.52 In other words, the 
water must have an acceptable colour, odour and taste necessary 
for personal and domestic use.53 Finally, in terms of accessibility, 
four overlapping dimensions were identified. These were (i) physical 
accessibility – focusing on the fact that adequate water facilities had 
to be close to all sections of the population; (ii) economic accessibility 
– this entails that water, and water facilities and services must be 
affordable for all; (iii) non-discrimination – this entails that water and 
water facilities and services must be accessible to all, including the 
most vulnerable or marginalised sections of the population; and (iv) 
information accessibility – this includes the right to seek, receive and 
impart information concerning water issues.54
Another critical aspect of General Comment 15 was that involving 
the general legal obligations of state parties.55 The ESCR Committee 
observed that, while ICESCR provided for progressive realisation, in 
acknowledgment of the critical challenge of available resources, state 
parties have immediate obligations concerning the right to water.56 
These include the guarantee to dispense the right to water without 
discrimination and the obligation to take deliberate, concrete and 
targeted steps to realise articles 11(1) and 12 of ICESCR in as far as 
they relate to the right to water.57 The ESCR Committee stated:58 
State parties have a constant and continuing duty under the Covenant 
to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
realisation of the right to water. The realisation of the right should be 
feasible and practicable, since all states parties exercise control over 
a broad range of resources, including water, technology, financial 
resources and international assistance, as with all other rights in the 
Covenant.
This requires, as with all other rights, that states respect, promote 
and fulfil this right.59 The obligation to ‘respect’ includes the fact 
that states must refrain from engaging in any practice or activity 
that results in the limitation of equal access to water or arbitrarily 
interfering with traditional or customary arrangements for water 
52 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 5.
53 As above.
54 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 6.




59 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 (2002) 9.
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allocations.60 This includes ‘disconnecting any person’s water supply 
arbitrarily, without notice, consultation or reasonable opportunity 
for redress or in any situation where the person genuinely cannot 
afford water’.61 The obligation to ‘protect’ requires the state to take 
all measures necessary to ensure that third parties do not interfere 
with the enjoyment of the right to water. This includes putting 
in place measures to ensure that any agents (individuals, groups, 
corporations and other entities) acting under their authority observe 
this obligation.62 The obligation to ‘fulfil’ requires states to facilitate, 
promote and provide.63 The obligation to promote dictates that the 
state must take positive measures to ensure the enjoyment of the 
right, while the obligation to provide entails that the state must assist 
individuals or groups that are unable to realise this right through 
their own means.64
Subsequent conventions became explicitly clear in recognising 
the right to water. Examples are the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which in 
article 14(2)(h) entitles women to enjoy adequate living conditions, 
which include the right to water.65 As far as children’s rights are 
concerned, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in article 
23 provides for ‘the right of a child to enjoy the highest standards of 
life, to combat diseases and malnutrition ... [provision] of adequate 
nutritious food and clean drinking water’.66 Article 14(2)(c) of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter) binds state parties to take measures to ensure the 
provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water.67 
Given these developments, on 28 July 2010 the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution 64/292 which recognises 
the human rights to water and sanitation, acknowledging the 
centrality of these rights in the realisation of all human rights.68 In 
terms of this resolution, states and international organisations are 
encouraged to provide financial resources for the purpose of building 
60 As above.
61 Right to Water and Sanitation Programme legal resources for the right to water and 
sanitation: International and national standards (2008) 13.
62 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 9.
63 As above.
64 ESCR Committee General Comment 15 10.
65 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981.
66 Convention on the Rights of Children, adopted 20 November 1989, entered 
into force 2 September 1990.
67 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
68 General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010. See also United Nations 
‘International Decade for Action ‘Water for life’ 2005-2015’, https://www.
un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml (accessed 30 March 
2021).
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capacity to realise the rights to water and sanitation.69 The Resolution 
also welcomes the decision by the Human Rights Council that the 
independent expert on human rights obligations related to access 
to safe drinking water and sanitation must submit an annual report 
to the General Assembly.70 This is built upon earlier resolutions of 
the Human Rights Council on human rights, specifically the rights to 
water and sanitation, such as Council Resolutions 7/22 of 28 March 
2008 and 12/8 of 1 October 2009 as well as General Comment 15 
by the ESCR Committee.71
It has been a decade since the recognition of water and sanitation as 
human rights by the UN General Assembly. The Special Rapporteur72 
on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation,73 Léo 
Heller, released a statement to mark the occasion.74 He was of the view 
that the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution on the rights 
to water and sanitation had positively influenced other decisions.75 
He cited three specific examples for this purpose. First, the Human 
Rights Council in September 2010 adopted Resolution 15/9 which 
affirmed the recognition of the rights to water and sanitation by the 
General Assembly. The Resolution clarified the legal recognition of 
these rights, observing that the rights were derivatives of the right 
to an adequate standard of living, which is considered a binding 
human right in most states. 
Second, in May 2011 the WHO passed Resolution 64/24. This 
Resolution calls upon member states to ensure that their national 
health strategies promote the rights to water and sanitation as well 
as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in so far as they 
relate to water and sanitation.76 Finally, the UN General Assembly in 
December 2015 adopted Resolution 70/169 which acknowledges 
69 As above.
70 General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010.
71 As above.
72 A Special Rapporteur is an investigator who, within special procedure 
mechanisms, reports on a specific country perspective or a thematic issue to the 
UN Human Rights Council. They are appointed on a three-year basis without 
remuneration. By September 2020, there were 44 thematic and 11 country 
mandates. See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
‘Special procedures of the Human Rights Council’, https://www.ohchr.org 
(accessed 31 March 2021).
73 The function of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Water and Sanitation had 
been there since 2008. Back then, the expert was called an independent expert 
on water and sanitation. The title changed in 2010 to Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation when the UN General Assembly 
Resolution was passed. 
74 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner ‘10th anniversary 
of the recognition of water and sanitation as a human right by the General 
Assembly’, https://www.ohchr.org (accessed 30 March 2021). 
75 As above. 
76 See World Health Organisation Resolution 64/24.
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that the rights to water and sanitation are separate and distinct rights, 
which require different treatment to avoid possible implementation 
challenges and the possible neglect of sanitation as a result of it 
being treated as a secondary right. 
The Special Rapporteur also noted that an important and critical 
achievement with regard to the rights to water and sanitation was 
the increased recognition of the links between the rights to water 
and sanitation and other human rights.77 This accounts for a very 
important consideration in the human rights framework, that is, 
the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. This work, 
in the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, has been supported the 
development of the domestic framework as well as the improved 
roles of various institutions and stakeholders. 
For instance, the Special Rapporteur notes the refreshment of 
various legal frameworks since 2010 in countries such as Costa 
Rica, Egypt, Fiji, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Slovenia, Somalia, 
Tunisia and Zimbabwe, which now provide for express rights in 
this regard. He further observed that other countries that already 
afforded constitutional protection to these rights, such as Australia, 
Nepal and Togo, had gone a step further by developing subordinate 
legislation to enunciate the scope and limitations of these rights. 
Concerning the institutional framework, the Special Rapporteur 
noted the importance of the roles of players such as autonomous 
water bodies and civil society organisations. More importantly, he 
observed the special role played by the courts. Many jurisdictions 
had passed judgments that reflected the UN General Assembly’s 
decision to extend protection to these rights. For example, the Court 
of Appeal in Botswana, in the matter of Mosetlhanyane & Others v 
Attorney-General,78 affirmed the rights to water and sanitation. In 
coming to its decision, the Appeal Court cited UN General Assembly 
Resolution 64/292.79 It further observed the interdependence of the 
rights to water and sanitation to the rights to health and life. 
The analysis of the Special Rapporteur concerning the rights 
to water and sanitation is critical but fair. Developments on the 
international front around these rights have been slow but steady. 
Over time, these developments have placed many governments in 
77 ‘Water and sanitation as a human right by the General Assembly’, https://www.
ohchr.org (accessed 30 March 2021). 
78 (2011) CACLB-074-10.
79 See, eg, Mosetlhanyane & Others v Attorney-General of Botswana (2011) 
CACLB-074-10 16.
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a better position in which they can promote, protect and fulfil these 
rights as a result of the enhanced legal standing these particular rights 
now enjoy through interpretation and recognition (for example, via 
the various Resolutions discussed above).
3 Right to water as a constitutional right
Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that every 
person has the right to safe, clean and potable water.80 An obligation 
is placed upon the state to take legislative and other measures within 
the resources available to ensure the progressive realisation of this 
right.81 The first point to note is that, unlike other rights that apply 
to citizens or persons who are ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe, the 
right to water is a right afforded to every person.82 This means that 
any person who is within the boundaries of Zimbabwe has a right 
to water regardless of their status, the legality of their presence in 
Zimbabwe, or the period of their stay therein. Once a person finds 
themselves within the boundaries of Zimbabwe, section 77 begins to 
operate in their favour.83 The second point is that the right to water 
is narrowed down to the right to potable, clean and safe water.84 
This must be distinguished from the right to have access to water 
bodies, the right to irrigation water, or the right to water in general 
as these fall in the ambit of environmental rights.85 The Zimbabwean 
Constitution specifically provides for the right to safe, clean and 
potable water. 
The question that arises at this juncture is what safe, clean and 
potable water is. What is the benchmark or, rather, the standard 
against which to measure whether water is safe, potable and clean? 
These questions are answered by General Comment 15 of the ESCR 
Committee.86 It provides that water, as contemplated by section 77 
of the 2013 Constitution, must be safe, therefore free from micro-
organisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards that 
constitute a threat to a person’s health. A further qualification was 
80 Sec 77 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
81 Sec 77(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
82 As above.
83 For an understanding of the meaning of the phrase ‘every person’, see A Magaisa 
‘Property rights in Zimbabwe’s draft Constitution: Zimbabwe Briefing’ Issue 86.
84 The rationale behind expressly providing for the right to potable, clean and 
safe drinking water is the need to preserve life in conformity with the obligation 
placed on the state.
85 Sec 73 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013.
86 PH Gleick ‘Basic water requirements for human activities: meeting basic needs’ 
(1996) 21 Water International Journal 83.
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that the water must be of acceptable colour, odour and taste for 
personal domestic use.87 
4 Mushoriwa case
4.1 Facts of the case
The case revolved around the issue of water disconnections in Harare 
as empowered under the Urban Councils Act and the Water Bylaws. 
Specifically, in May 2013 the applicant received a water account 
of US $1  700.88 The applicant disputed the contents of the bill, 
claiming that it belonged to a bulk water meter not connected to his 
leased premises.89 On 31 May 2013 the respondent unilaterally and 
arbitrarily disconnected the applicant’s water supply.90 The applicant 
then filed an urgent chamber application.91 Specifically, he sought a 
spoliation order directing the respondent to restore water services 
pending resolution of the dispute by the courts.92 
Noting the urgency of the matter, and the importance and 
centrality of the provision of water, Bhunu J, with the consent of the 
parties, ordered that water services be immediately restored pending 
the determination of the application.93 The rationale was that for the 
applicant to remain without water would be a ‘catastrophe’.94 The 
interim order, therefore, was aimed at ameliorating the situation.95 
Notwithstanding this lawful consent order prohibiting the 
respondent from disconnecting the water services of the applicant 
until the finalisation of the application, the respondent disconnected 
water services from the applicant’s premises without a lawful court 
order.96 For the respondent to restore water services at the applicant’s 
property, it required threats of imprisonment for contempt of a valid 
court order.97
87 Safe drinking water is water that can be delivered to the user and is safe for 
drinking or food preparation, personal hygiene and washing. The quality is 
relative and depends on the standards of each country: MO Dinka ‘Safe drinking 
water: Concepts, benefits, principles and standards’ (2018) Water Challenges of 
an Urbanising World, Intech Open.




92 Farai Mushoriwa v City of Harare HC 4266/13 HC ZWHHC 195.  
93 As above. 
94 As above.
95 As above.
96 As above.  
97 As above.
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It was argued by the applicant that the termination of water 
supplies by the respondent without a court order amounted to 
unlawful self-help.98 Moreover, it was the dispossession of the 
applicant’s peaceful and undisturbed possession of water.99 The High 
Court then issued a judgment granting a provisional order in favour 
of the applicant.100 The matter, in this case, is now an appeal of this 
High Court decision by the City of Harare. At the time of this appeal, 
the respondent (applicant in the High Court) had already vacated 
the premises in question.101
4.2 High Court decision
In analysing the matter, the Court first examined the context of the 
matter. The Court noted that the matter was one falling squarely 
within the rights and obligations of the water service provider and 
the consumer.102 Thereafter, the Court noted that the question to 
be answered was whether in the case of a disputed payment the 
appellant was entitled to self-help and unilaterally terminate water 
supplies to a citizen without recourse to law and become a law unto 
itself.103 From the pleadings, it appears that there was an agreement 
that there was an obligation on the respondent to provide water 
to the applicant and a concomitant duty on the latter to pay. The 
dispute was squarely on the different approaches taken by the parties 
on what happens if there is disagreement in reading payment. The 
argument by the Harare City Council was that the bylaws give it 
an unfettered discretion to discontinue water without recourse to 
the law. The applicant countered the argument by pointing out that 
such an interpretation would be ultra vires section 198 as read with 
section 69(2) of the Third Schedule to the Water Act. 
The Court found that in terms of the Act, the Council could only 
disconnect the water supply when it has sufficient proof that the 
amount claimed is due and after giving 24 hours’ notice. Although 
the dispute could be resolved through the interpretation of the bylaws 
and the enabling Act, it would have been undesirable to ignore the 
Constitution owing to the implications that the judgment would 
have on the Bill of Rights. The Court then considered section 77 of 
the Constitution and concluded that as a public body, the Council is 
mandated by section 44 of the same to refrain from denying a citizen 
98 As above.
99 As above.  
100 City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa (n 10).
101 As above.
102 Farai Mushoriwa v City of Harare (n 92) 195.
103 As above.
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water without just cause. It appears from a reading of the judgment 
that 24 hours’ notice and evidence of non-payment suffice as just 
cause to deny access to water. The Court further opined that where 
there is a dispute, it must be resolved by the court. Section 8 of the 
bylaw, therefore, was ultra vires the enabling Act and Constitution to 
the extent that it allows arbitrary disconnections.
4.3 Supreme Court decision104
Eight grounds of appeal were raised by the appellants in the Supreme 
Court, but these were narrowed down by the Court as relating to 
(i) the relief granted by the court a quo; and (ii) the legality of the 
appellant’s actions of disconnecting water generally.105 The second 
ground of appeal is relevant to this article. The appellant argued that 
the finding of the High Court that the bylaw which allows the City 
Council to disconnect water supply without recourse to the courts 
is both unconstitutional and ultra vires the enabling Act.106 It was 
further argued that the right to water is not absolute, but subject to 
limitations necessary for regional and town planning.107 
In the context of the above grounds of appeal the Supreme 
Court was called upon to make two determinations, namely, first, 
whether clause 8(a) of the Standard Contract (scheduled to the 
1913 bylaws)108 is inconsistent with the Third Schedule of the Urban 
Councils Act in so much as it allows the disconnection of water for 
non-payment by giving 24 hours’ notice and without compensation. 
The second issue was the determination of the constitutionality of 
the bylaws. With regard to the first issue, the respondents argued 
that section 198(3), which contains the phrase ‘in the opinion of the 
council’, is subject to the Third Schedule of the Act which omits the 
phrase, therefore prohibiting the council from acting arbitrarily.109 
The Supreme Court found this conclusion to be ‘somewhat narrow 
and unilineal’.110 It held that the broad enabling provision empowers 
every urban council to do whatever it deems necessary to administer 
or effectuate its bylaws.111 On the strength of this reasoning, it 
declared that the bylaws are intra vires the enabling provisions of 
the Act. The Court concluded that ‘the 1913 bylaws regarded as a 
104 As above.
105 City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa (n 10).
106 As above.
107 As above.
108 General Notice 164 of 1913 titled bylaws for Regulations the Supply and Use of 
Water within the Municipality of Salisbury.
109 City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa (n 10).
110 As above.
111 As above.
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whole, are not only compliant and intra vires the enabling provisions 
of the Urban Councils Act, but also perfectly concordant with the 
overreaching notions of reasonableness’.112
The second issue for determination was whether the bylaws 
were constitutional in allowing the disconnection of water for non-
payment by giving 24 hours’ notice and without compensation. The 
Court referred to Gabru’s work on the right to water in South Africa113 
in holding that the obligation imposed on the state is not unqualified 
to impose a duty on the state to provide water upon demand.114 
It noted that the reference to access rather than the right to the 
water means that the state only has an obligation towards those 
without means to ensure access to water.115 More fundamentally 
it held that ‘the availability of access to food and water depends 
upon the availability of the resources at the disposal of the state’.116 
The Court associated itself with the reasoning of Gabru117 ‘that 
fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute, their boundaries 
being demarcated by the rights of others and by legitimate needs of 
society’.118
4.3.1 Implications of Supreme Court decision in the Mushoriwa 
case
The decision by the Supreme Court in the Mushoriwa case has a 
significant impact not only on the realisation of the right to water as a 
constitutional right, but also has a bearing on the social context. The 
Supreme Court established that the relationship between the state 
and a citizen about the right to water is the same as that between 
a service provider and a consumer. Properly understood, this means 
that, whereas the state must provide safe water to its citizens, there 
is a concomitant duty placed on the recipients to pay for the water 
they consume.119 Accordingly, it is permissible and constitutional for 
water to be disconnected on 24 hours’ notice and for non-payment. 
In this regard, the Court summarised as follows:120 
Bearing in mind the enormous economic and budgetary considerations 
that would ordinarily arise in the provision of safe and clean water to 
112 As above.
113 N Gabru ‘Some comments on water rights in South Africa’ (2005) 8 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 12.
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a large populace, it cannot be said that the disconnection of water 
supply because of non-payment for water consumed in any specific 
instance constitutes an infringement of the constitutional right to 
water. Indeed, it may be necessary to do so to ensure that the majority 
of non-defaulting consumers continue to enjoy their respective rights 
to water. This approach accords squarely with the dictates of section 
86(1) of the Constitution, to wit, that fundamental rights and freedoms 
must be exercised reasonably and with due regard to the rights and 
freedoms of others.
The other implication of this decision is that it makes no provision 
for those who are not in a financial position to pay for the water they 
consume. The assumption is that every person can pay for water 
provision rendered by the state and that, therefore, those who do not 
pay must have their water supply disconnected to compel them to 
pay since they have capacity. In reaction to the Mazibuko judgment, 
which essentially is similar to the one under review, Rothmyr remarked 
that the Court approached the issue of disconnections based on an 
assumption that people do not pay because they are bad and are 
unwilling to settle their obligations.121
On the social sphere, the Mushoriwa judgment leaves the poor 
and the vulnerable exposed to the risks associated with a lack of 
access to clean, safe and potable water. With the legal obligation 
placed on the state to ensure the progressive realisation of the 
right to water diluted by the concomitant obligation placed on the 
recipient to pay for the water, there is no legal recourse for the poor. 
If the City Council decides to follow the letter of the law and proceed 
to disconnect the water supply to everyone who fails to pay for the 
service on the strength of this judgment, the result would be a social 
catastrophe.122
5 Critique of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision 
in the Mushoriwa case
As can be gleaned from the previous part, the reasoning and 
judgment of the Supreme Court in the Mushoriwa case presents us 
with several problems as far as the realisation of the right to water 
is concerned. Since the right to water is located within the social 
context, the decision has the potential of having a detrimental effect 
on the social well-being of the populace. It is submitted, with respect, 
that the Court failed to take into consideration the social impact the 
121 2010 CCR 317.
122 Farai Mushoriwa v City of Harare (n 92) 195.
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decision bore which, had they so considered, would have led the 
Court to a different conclusion.
First, the right to water is unique in its character and substance, 
thus it should not be analysed in isolation. An analysis of the right 
to water lays bare the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
universal human rights. The right to water, therefore, is inherent in 
other human rights, the most important being the right to life. Section 
48 of the Constitution provides for the right to life,123 as does article 
6(1) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).124 Section 86(3)(a) of the Constitution makes the right to 
life absolute except in terms where the death penalty is imposed by 
a court of law in limited circumstances. It has been argued that the 
right to life requires a broader and extensive interpretation which 
imposes both a negative and positive obligation on the state in 
ensuring that the right is fully enjoyed. In the General Comment 
on the Right to Life, the Human Rights Council observed that ‘[t]he 
right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression 
“inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive 
manner, and the expression of this right requires that states adopt 
positive measures.’125 
Taking this interpretation about the right to water, a synergy 
between the two rights was established. It was well put in the 
following manner:126 
Disregarding this new development in the understanding of article 6 
of ICCPR and assuming a narrow interpretation of such a right will 
nevertheless require the inclusion of the protection against arbitrary 
and intentional denial of access to sufficient water because this is one 
of the most fundamental resources necessary to sustain life.
Put differently, the right to water gives life to the right to life, for 
no person can survive without access to clean water. It follows that, 
even if the argument that the right to water is not absolute and can 
therefore be limited in terms of section 86 of the Constitution, such 
an argument would eventually not stand if this submission is anything 
to go by. Limiting the right to water essentially is tantamount to 
limiting the right to life and, therefore, it becomes unconstitutional 
even though this can be a far- reaching argument, and unlawful. 
The same argument will apply mutatis mutandis concerning the right 
to water and the right to human dignity which is also an absolute 
123 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
124 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1973.
125 General Comment 6.
126 J Scanion et al Water as a human right? (2004) 53.
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right.127 It warrants no argument to say that a person’s dignity is 
violated when they are denied access to clean water regardless of the 
intelligence of the grounds.
This argument is also sustained by the jurisprudence developed 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the right to water. 
It has been said that since the right to water is not included in the 
International Bill of Rights, its recognition has been achieved in two 
ways: first, as a subordinate right necessary for the realisation of other 
recognised rights whether civil and political rights or social economic, 
and cultural rights (derivative right); second, the right to water can 
be recognised as a stand-alone, new right (stand-alone right).128 
Proceeding from this standpoint, and assuming the argument that 
the right to water as provided for by the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
can be limited, it creates an absurdity when the right of water is 
derived from the right(s) to life and human dignity and, therefore, 
cannot be limited in terms of section 86 of the Constitution.
In other words, the effect of finding that the right to water can 
be limited may be summarised as follows: When the right to water is 
derivative from the right to life, it is absolute, but when it is provided 
as a stand-alone right, it can be limited in terms of section 86. The 
logical impurity of such a scenario is that the right to water will be 
afforded more and stronger protection in countries that do not 
explicitly provide for it in their constitutions, and weaker and less 
pronounced protection in countries that explicitly recognise the 
right. 
The Court’s finding in Mushoriwa that the right to water as 
enshrined in the Constitution places a concomitant obligation on the 
right holder to pay for the service is also problematic. The juridical 
impurity of such a finding is twofold, namely, (a) it neglects to canvass 
the issue of affordability; and (b) it significantly limits the obligation 
of the state to ensure that there is sufficiently clean, potable water for 
its people. These two issues will be dealt with in turn. 
5.1 Affordability
Paragraph 12(c)(ii) of General Comment 15129 reads that water and 
water facilities and services must be affordable for all. The direct 
127 Sec 51 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
128 JM Chávarro ‘The right to water in the case-law of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ in R Abello-Galvis (ed) Annuario Colombiano Derecho Internacional 
(2014) 39.
129 As above.
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and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must 
be affordable. The issue of affordability ought to be canvassed 
sufficiently to establish what it contemplates as it is a relative 
concept that depends on the status and income of an individual. To 
some, affordability means parting with a few dollars while to others 
affordability may mean not paying anything at all. It is this latter 
class of people that are especially sought to be protected when the 
application of the right to water is analysed. 
Section 56 of the Constitution prohibits, among other things, 
discrimination based on economic status.130 Paragraph 13 of General 
Comment 15 recognises that vulnerable members of society must be 
protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes. 
Hence, there cannot be a blanket application of measures, but such 
should be targeted and specifically chosen to have regard to the 
income and economic status of each community. That there is a state 
obligation to provide water for free to people who cannot pay for 
the water was put beyond doubt by the General Comment.131 The 
societal and economic situation of Zimbabwe ought to be taken into 
consideration when determining the issue of affordability, where over 
90 per cent of the population is not formally employed. The Court 
should have concluded that a considerable portion of the population 
would not have the means to pay their water bills. Even Gabru, on 
whose work the Court relied, insinuated that ‘the state’s duty is only 
limited to those sections of the population without the means to 
ensure access to health care, food, water, and social security’.132 
Commenting on the South African case of Mazibuko, Kidd observed 
that the inability to pay for prepaid water would mean spending 
a considerable time without not only sufficient water but without 
water completely.133 This highlights the adverse social impact of the 
lack of access to safe drinking water.
5.2 Obligation of the state
In addition to the international obligation of the state to ensure access 
to clean drinking water, section 77 of the Constitution also imposes 
an obligation on the state to take legislative and other measures, 
within the resources available to it, to ensure the progressive 
realisation of this right. A narrow interpretation of this phrase, as 
adopted by the Supreme Court in the Mushoriwa case, will effectively 
130 Sec 56(3) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
131 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (n 74).
132 Gabru (n 93) 12.
133 M Kidd Environmental law (2008) 92.
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lift this responsibility from the state to the citizens. This provision 
requires the state to be innovative, creative and to take positive steps 
to ensure that everyone – the ‘haves’ as well as the ‘have-nots’ – 
has access to clean and adequate water. Once the state relies solely 
on the purportedly concomitant obligation to pay for water, it has 
abdicated its obligation. 
This approach is not congruent with the constitutional obligation 
inherent in the right to water. The state should find ways to protect 
those who cannot afford it, for they are also entitled to the enjoyment 
of the right. Such an obligation was placed on the state in the full 
realisation that ‘all state parties exercise control over a broad range 
of resources including water, technology, financial resources, and, 
international assistance’.134 Perhaps the Zimbabwean government 
can take lessons from South Africa, which provides a limited amount 
of potable water free of charge to poor households.135 It is also 
estimated that at least 7,5 million (13 per cent) South Africans 
access no-cost drinking water through communal taps provided by 
municipalities.136 Worth noting is the fact that the free basic water 
made accessible to these households through public taps can easily 
surpass the 6m3 per month per household that is prescribed by law.137 
It appears more encompassing and progressive, and a considerable 
fulfilment of the state’s obligation.
The other ground for disagreeing with the decision of the Court 
is that it failed to apply its mind on the social implications of its 
judgment, particularly on women and children. It has already been 
highlighted that women and children, as vulnerable groups, have 
their right to water that is recognised under international law. When 
water is disconnected from a household, it is the women and children 
that suffer the most among other vulnerable groups, such as persons 
with disabilities. For women and children, the water crisis is personal. 
They are responsible for finding a resource their families need to 
survive for drinking, cooking, sanitation and hygiene.
Scanion138 noted that the right to water provided in CEDAW139 
was a realisation of the traditional burden placed upon women in 
134 Para 18 General Comment 15.
135 City of Harare v Farai Mushoriwa (n 10).
136 KW Scheihing et al ‘A strategy to enhance management of free basic water via 
communal taps in South Africa’ (2020) 64 Utilities Policy 1043.
137 Free Basic Water Implementation Strategy Version 2, now superseded by Free 
Basic Water Implementation Strategy 2007. See further Mazibuko & Others v City 
of Johannesburg & Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 167-169 where the Court 
upheld the free basic water policy.
138 As above.
139 As above.
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developing countries go long distances to fetch water. The plight 
of children is far worse. Being children, they do not have money to 
pay for the water and rely on the ability of their parents to do so, 
failing which they are exposed to a lack of access to water, diseases, 
and general traumatic conditions. A household is a composite unit, 
which often includes women and children not disregarding the ever-
evolving composition of families, and if the Court had considered 
their welfare, it probably would have arrived at a different conclusion.
In any event, section 81(2) of the Zimbabwean Constitution 
unequivocally states that in any matter that may involve a child, the 
best interests of the child are the paramount consideration. Although 
this was not a matter brought before the Court, it would have been 
prudent to consider the implications of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in later matters, and how this ruling could effectively limit 
the rights of vulnerable groups such as women and children. In this 
case, the interests of the child were not even considered, let alone 
given significant consideration. It was incumbent upon the Court 
to consider such interests, but the Court failed the child. According 
to section 81(2) it is unconstitutional for a court to give a judgment 
that is averse to the welfare of the child. The lack of clean, sufficient 
water is an antithesis to the best interests of the child.
5.3 Comparative law
Recent jurisprudential developments regarding the right to 
water have added another requirement that must be present for 
disconnections to be justified. Where both substantive and procedural 
requirements as discussed above have been met to warrant legal 
water disconnections, water authorities must ensure the provision 
of basic minimum amounts of water and sanitation to the person 
faced with disconnection, in order to preserve life.140 Disconnections, 
therefore, must only affect the individual to the extent that he is 
deprived of access to water which is beyond that which is necessary 
for his basic well-being and survival. The underlying argument here 
is that access to a basic minimum amount of water has nothing to 
do with the ability to pay, but has everything to do with dignity, 
health, and the realisation of other rights, even where disconnection 
is allowed. 
140 C de Albuquerque ‘On the right track: Good practices in realising the right to 
water and sanitation’ United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to 
Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Lisbon 2012.
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In South Africa, the Constitution141 which also enshrines the 
right to sufficient water in section 27, mirroring section 77 of the 
Constitution, the courts have had to rule on the issue. In the case 
of Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council142 the Court held that the disconnection of water supply 
must not result in the denial of basic water supply for non-payment 
where the person proves, to the satisfaction of the authorities, that 
they are not able to pay for basic water services. In finding against 
the Council, the Court established that the respondent had neither 
proved that the disconnections were carried out on valid grounds, 
nor did it show that due process was followed in effecting the 
disconnections. This is an approach that has been recommended for 
adoption in Indian jurisprudence on the right to water.143
However, some countries have gone a step further by expressly 
prohibiting the disconnection of water for domestic use. The United 
Kingdom government in 1999 amended its Water Industry Act to the 
effect that disconnections of water and sewage services for reasons 
of non-payment by domestic consumers became illegal. In New 
Zealand the Local Governance Act prohibits the disconnection of 
water and sanitation services except in the interests of public health. 
The approach that was taken by the court here is progressive. It only 
requires those affected by the disconnection to allege that there 
indeed was a disconnection. 
The onus will fall on the authority carrying out the disconnection 
to prove that the disconnection was done according to valid 
grounds and that due process was followed. It is not for the affected 
persons to prove that the disconnections were done on invalid 
grounds and that due process was not followed. In Ademar Manoel 
Pereira x Companhia Catarinense de Agua e Saneamento – CASAN,144 
for example, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça in Brazil dismissed an 
appeal by the State Water Utility after it had shut down the water 
supply to a resident who was experiencing financial difficulties as 
a result of the accidental burning down of the resident’s dwelling 
(a wooden shack). The Superior Tribunal found that water was an 
essential public service that could not be interrupted based on non-
payment, in the event of a lack of means. Such disconnections were 
found to be inhumane illegal acts. The Superior Tribunal Reasoned 
as follows:
141 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
142 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W).
143 J Kothari ‘The right to water: A constitutional perspective’ (2005) 8 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 1.
144 Superior Tribunal de Justiça Resp [1999] 201 112.
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The water company must use the appropriate legal means available 
and it cannot take justice in its own hands as we live in the rule of 
law and disputes are decided by the judiciary and not by individuals. 
It further emphasised that ‘[w]ater is an essential and indispensable 
good for the health and hygiene of the population. Its supply is an 
indispensable public service, which is subordinated to the principle 
of continuity, making impossible its interruption especially due to late 
payment.’
It referred to its own earlier judgment in case 8.915 – MA, DJ of 
17 August 1998 where it was ruled that 
water supply, because it is a fundamental public service, essential 
and vital for human beings, cannot be suspended for late payment 
of respective fees, as the public administration has reasonable means 
to recover user debts. Moreover, if the public services are provided 
on behalf of all the community, it is an illegal measure to deny it to a 
consumer merely for late payment.145
Another interesting case in South Africa was City of Cape Town v 
Strümpher.146 As opposed to the approach of the Superior Tribunal, 
particularly about the issue of the disconnection of water services 
for non-payment, Ademar Manoel Pereira x Companhia Catarinense 
de Agua e Saneamento – CASAN, which approached the matter of 
disconnections from a public service public good perspective, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal approached the issue of disconnection of 
water supply over non-payment as not only a right to water violation, 
but also a fairness and equity violation. The thinking in this regard 
was that ‘[t]he ‘right to the supply of water cannot be construed 
as only resulting from contractual obligations without giving any 
consideration to the principles of fairness and equity which apply in 
case of disconnection of water supply under South African law’.147
In Quevedo, Miguel Ángel y Otros c/Aguas Cordobesas SA148 the Juez 
Sustituta de Primera Instancia Civil y Comercial in Argentina adopted 
a similar approach to Ademar Manoel Pereira x Companhia Catarinense 
de Agua e Saneamento – CASAN, identifying the public service nature 
of the water provision. However, the two cases differ on whether or 
not disconnections should be permissible. It was held in Quevedo 
that if private water companies (under a public concession contract) 
sought to disconnect water over non-payment, they must provide a 
minimum daily amount of 200 litres of water per household, if the 
145 As above.
146 2012 54 (ZASCA).
147 As above.
148 Quevedo, Miguel Ángel y Otros c/ Aguas Cordobesas SA (2002) Juez Sustituta de 
Primera Instancia Civil y Comercial (Ciudad de Córdoba).
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reason for the disconnection of the water supply was non-payment 
due to a lack of means. 
From these cases it is clear that there is no one approach to dealing 
with the issue of disconnections across jurisdictions. However, the 
preferred approach is that disconnections for non-payment are 
lawful only on the condition that they are not arbitrary and that the 
person facing disconnections is left with access to a basic minimum 
amount of water necessary for their well-being.
6 The missed opportunity
The Mushoriwa case presented the judiciary with the opportunity to 
pronounce itself on the scope of the obligation of the state to ensure 
the realisation of socio-economic and cultural rights. It should be 
noted that the decision in Mushoriwa transcends beyond the right 
to water, to include most socio-economic rights. Unfortunately, 
the effect of the judgment was that there is no distinction between 
the right to water before the enactment of the 2013 Constitution 
and after its enactment, although the 2013 Constitution introduces 
third-generation rights in Zimbabwe’s constitutional dispensation. 
There was an expectation that the Court would use the Constitution 
as a transformative tool, in transforming the society following the 
emerging notions of social justice. A comment on the role of the 
South African Constitution in transforming society is instructive:149 
At the same time, the Constitution could not only look into the past but 
also needed to provide some kind of vision of the future society South 
Africa would become. There are elements of the Constitution which 
we classify under the heading ‘reform’ that are not backward-looking 
but seek to provide a blueprint for a future just society: the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution, we argue, fall under this heading, 
although they are also partly justified by the redress component.
The narrative of the transformative nature of the Constitution was 
outlined by Klare who distinguishes a constitutional order that seeks to 
retain and maintain the status quo from the one that seeks to transform 
it. He theorises the latter as transformative constitutionalism which 
he describes as ‘a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement … committed to transforming a 
country’s political and social institutions’.150 
149 D Bilchitz International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDES): Assessing the performance of the South African Constitution 
(2016).
150 K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 146.
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The Constitution of Zimbabwe is transformative having been 
a product of over a decade of lobbying for a new constitution. It 
marks a break with the past and also sets goals for the future and the 
new trajectory on which the country shall traverse. The concept of 
transformative constitutionalism was not only negated but the Court 
saw a 1913 bylaw which related to access to water compliant with a 
constitution enacted in 2013, 100 years later. 
7 Conclusion 
The Mushoriwa v City of Harare judgment, with respect, fundamentally 
limits the realisation of not only the right to water but to socio-
economic rights in the broader sense. It therefore is impugned on 
the grounds canvassed herein. It is based on a narrow and isolated 
appreciation of the declaration of rights, generally, and the right to 
water, in particular. Disconnections of water supplies for domestic 
use where access pre-exists is lawful only under very limited 
circumstances. It is submitted that the disconnection of water supply 
for non-payment should be in strict adherence to due process so that 
it does not become arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Foreign jurisprudence discussed in this article, especially in the 
case of Ademar Manoel Pereira x Companhia Catarinense de Agua 
e Saneamento – CASAN, demonstrates that the disconnection of 
water services for non-payment should be deemed an inhuman and 
illegal act which should not be given space in our societies. This 
is particularly because of the impact of water disconnections on 
health and hygiene, as well as on other inter-related human rights 
such as life and dignity. While such foreign jurisprudence only has a 
persuasive value in our jurisdiction, it is instructive in demonstrating 
the availability of much bolder approaches in the recognition, 
application and enforcement of the right to water. 
The substance of the right to water and how it is inherent in 
some of the non-derogable rights in the Constitution must compel 
us to lean towards outlawing disconnections rather than legalising 
them. The importance of access to water was even noticed in the 
High Court in the Mushoriwa case where the judge had to order 
that pending the determination of the case, water access had to be 
restored immediately. The judge stated:151
151 Mushoriwa v City of Harare HH-195-14 (our emphasis).
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Having regard to the urgency of the case when seized with the matter 
I immediately ordered by consent of the parties restoration of the 
water services forthwith pending the determination of this application 
to avert a catastrophe as one cannot survive without water. The 
respondent duly complied thereby ameliorating the urgency of the 
matter.
It therefore is an affront of logic to assume that there will be no 
catastrophe if water disconnections stemming from non-payment 
take place. 
However, if the thinking is that non-payment is a legitimate ground 
for disconnections, on the basis that citizens would not be compelled 
to pay their water bills if there are no serious consequences in the case 
of non-payment (such as disconnections), there must still be a rights-
based approach to this. The UN Human Rights Council Independent 
Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Related to Access to 
Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation in 2010 identified an approach 
that could be useful for this purpose. The expert noted:152
When water disconnections are carried out due to defaulting payment, 
due process must be followed before disconnection and it must 
be ensured that individuals still have at least access to a minimum 
essential level of water. Likewise, when water-borne sanitation is used, 
water disconnections must not result in denying access to sanitation.
Therefore, if water disconnections take place, the minimum core 
obligations concerning this right must still be realised. This having 
been said, it may be soundly concluded that, while including the 
right to water in the Declaration of Rights was one step forward, the 
restrictive interpretation of the right by the courts and the pursuance 
of cost recovery measures by the state effectively make the right 
redundant and makes a mockery of the Declaration of Rights in 
totality.
152 Cited in W United & W Lex The human rights to water and sanitation worldwide: 
A selection of national, regional and international case law (2014) 28. See also 
UNHRC Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Related 
to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation ‘Good practices related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation: Questionnaire’ (2010) [Question 3].
